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BENEFITS, COSTS, AND RISKS: OVERSIGHT OF
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONMAKING
William H. Rodgers, Jr.*

Recent years have brought increased reaction to the successes of the
environmental movement. The pervasiveness of environmental regulation
has prompted inflation-conscious skeptics in the White House and on
Capitol Hill to rally around the cries of industry that environmental and
health protection costs too much.' Under the banner of regulatory reform,
these critics have sought to make regulations more "efficient." 2 They
insist that the costs imposed by environmental and health regulations be
justified by their benefits.3 The panacea they offer, in one form or another,
is cost-benefit analysis.
The ethic of efficiency has been espoused by members of every
branch of government. President Carter has ordered that all agencies take
steps to minimize the economic burdens that their regulations impose
upon the private sector. 4 Enforcing this mandate, the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group has insisted that major regulatory proposals be subjected
to rigorous and complete analysis of all costs and benefits.5 Congress, too,
has been contemplating a variety of attempts at regulatory reform. Dozens of bills have been submitted, proposing legislative vetoes, stricter
judicial review, "sunset" provisions, and other measures. 6 The leading
measures urging comprehensive reform require also some analysis of the
costs and benefits of major regulatory programs and proposals. 7 Even the
*Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B. 1961 Harvard College; LL.B.

1965, Columbia University. The author expresses appreciation for the review of a draft of
this article by Professors Gardner M. Brown, Institute for Economic Research; Leonard

Goodisman, Graduate School of Public Affairs; and Richard 0. Zerbe, Program in Social
Management of Technology, University of Washington.
1. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 557 (Mar. 23, 1978). See Light, No FloorAction
Seen on Regulatory Reform Until Next Year, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2543 (1979).
2. See 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 557 (Mar. 23, 1978).
3. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979).
4. Statement on Executive Order 12044, Improving Government Regulations, 14
WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 562 (Mar. 23, 1978).
5. See Tolchin, PresidentialPower and the Politics of RARG, REGULATION 44 (July/
Aug. 1979).
6. See Light, supra note 1. See also Comment, Reconditioning the Administrativ
Process: Congress Weighs "Regulatory Reform" Legislation, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. (ELr)
10,100 (1979).
7. S.262, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S861-69 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979); S.
755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S3338-45 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1979); S. 1291, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S7128-34 (daily ed. June 5, 1979); S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S19040-52 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979).
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courts have championed the cost-benefit ethic. The Fifth Circuit declared
recently that before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
can promulgate any standard to protect workers' health, it must demonstrate that the benefits expected bear a reasonable relationship to the
costs.8
The cost-benefit fervor is not universally contagious. Critics condemn the cost-benefit movement as a charade, and an attempt not to make
regulation efficient, but rather to defeat it altogether. 9 Experts caution
that the limits and distortion of the methodology are ignored systematically by cost-benefit advocates.10 And Congress continues to prohibit
application of cost-benefit principles in some areas. To mention but one
example, the Delaney Clause, I I prohibiting the use of carcinogenic chemicals in foods, is defended strongly in Congress, 12 despite confident
assertions that benefits of the practice greatly outweigh the risks.' 3
8. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440
U.S. 906 (1979) (Nos. 78-911, 78-1036) (argued Oct. 10, 1979, 48 U.S.L.W. 3256). The Fifth
Circuit relied on the "reasonably necessary" language of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA). An "occupational safety and health standard" is defined as "a standard
which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment." (29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976)). 581 F. 2d at 503,
following Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831
(5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting comparable language in the Consumer, Product Safety Act).
This substantive conclusion was buttressed by finding in OSHA a procedural obligation to estimate benefits as well as costs, in order to assess the reasonableness of their
relationships. OSHA's failure to estimate the benefits in addition to costs deprived the rule
of evidentiary support necessary to sustain it before a reviewing court. 581 F.2d at 503-04.
The benzene decision is understood as being a harbinger for wider endorsement of costbenefit methodologies in health and safety decisionmaking. See Tolchin, supra note 5, at 44.
The D.C. Circuit recently characterized the Fifth Circuit's benzene decision as "especially
unpersuasive." AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No. 78-1562, slip op. at 57 n.169 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 24,
1979, as amended Nov. 14, 1979).
9. House SUBCOMM.

ON

OVERSIGHT

FOREIGN COMMERCE COMMITTEE,

AND INVESTIGATIONS, INTERSTATE AND
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND

REGULATION REFORM 555 (Subcomm. Print 1976); Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The
Cop-Out of Government Regulation, 14 TRIAL MAGAZINE 44, 47 (Feb. 1978). See also M.
GREEN & N. WAITZMAN, BUSINESS WAR ON THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL HEALTIiISAFETY ENFORCEMEN4T (1979) (The Corporate Accountability Research

Group).
10. Even the Administrative Conference offers precautionary advice about agency use
of cost-benefit analyses (mostly calling for clarification of methodologies undertaken) consistent with a report critical of current practices prepared for the Conference's Committee on
Agency Decisional Process. Draft Recommendation on Use of Cost-Benefit and Other
Similar Analytical Methods of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 12,198 (1979). See also M. Baram,
Regulation of Health, Safety and Environmental Quality and the Use of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (Mar. 1, 1979).
11. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
12. See

REPORT ON SACCHARIN EXTENSION,

TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL AND

H.R. REP. No. 348, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
13. Martin, The Delaney Clause and Zero Risk Tolerance, 34 FOOD, DRUG, & COSM.
L. J. 43 (1979); See Hutt, Public Policy Issues in RegulatingCarcinogensin Food, 33 FOOD,
DRUG, & CosM. L.J. 541, 556 (1978) ("the essential element in future food safety policy
consists of a risk analysis, rather than a benefit analysis") ("the concept of'benefit' remains
a wholly subjective determination that defies logic or even objective analysis").
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This article considers problems of "regulatory reform" in the context
of environmental and health decisionmaking. Specifically, in part I, this
article defines cost-benefit analysis, explores its advantages and limitations, and assays cost-benefit practice in light of descriptive theoretical
and practical demands of formal decisionmaking14 within administrative
agencies. The two remaining sections of this article focus on the question
of how Congress and the courts can, do, and should structure environmental and health regulation. In part II, the article explores legislative
models for agency consideration of costs and benefits in promulgating
regulations. It examines four alternative models, and identifies normative
considerations
the choice of formulation.
Structuring influencing
agency consideration of costs in promulgating regulations, however, is but a partial solution.. Under any model of costconsideration, critical policy issues remain-the resolution of uncertainty
and the protection of agencies' predictive judgments. Decisions of
whether to regulate, and to what degree, often depend as much upon what
to do when facts are unavailable as upon assessment of statutory criteria.
Therefore, part III looks at standards of judicial review, and the assignment of burdens of production and proof as techniques of addressing
uncertainty.
I.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS-ITS ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS

A. The Theory and Its Limitations
Cost-benefit analysis is a methodology for determining which government actions, projects, or regulations are worth the investments and
sacrifices they require. '5 Its philosophical roots are the utilitarianism of
Jeremy Bentham. 16 Recognizing that government decisions often require
a reconciliation of incommensurable interests, cost-benefit analysis seeks
to reduce all concerns to a common denominator-the dollar. It then
compares the costs and benefits, in dollar terms, of competing government options. Cost-benefit analysis thus emulates the investment decision
of the private firm.
The theoretical limits of cost-benefit analysis have been well-assayed
in the literature.' 7 A fundamental limitation is that cost-benefit analysis
14. This article's definition of formal decisionmaking includes cost-benefit analysis,

and systems or decision analysis, which involves comparing alternatives, predicting consequences, and quantification. For a general introduction to terms, see E. STOKEY AND R.
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1978).

15. Steiner, The Theory of Marginal PublicExpenditure Choices, in

BENEFIT-COST

POLICY ANALYSIS 235 (1974); see Prest & Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75
ECON. J. 683, 686 (1965); E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL DECISION: ELEMENTS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 13 (1973).
16. Coddington, "Cost Benefit" as the New Utilitarianism, 43 POL. Q. 320 (1971).
17. E.g., 0. ECKSTEIN, WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT EVALUATION Ch. II (1961); R. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: WITH EMPHASIS ON WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT (1958); Wildavsky, The PoliticalEconomy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and
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measures only the economic efficiency 8 of alternative actions. It identifies which proposals offer the most pie for the money. Ordinarily, it
does not consider the sizes of the slices that get passed around, or who
receives them. 19

The measurement of efficiency poses severe practical difficulties, as
discussed below. 20 But the assumptions upon which this measurement
depends restrict even the theoretical power of the analysis. First, costbenefit analysis assumes that all interests can be adequately expressed in
dollars. It is undisputed that the dollar is by far the most common denominator in the valuation of commodities in our society. But it is also
clear that many things, indeed, many of those that we hold most dear, are
not readily susceptible to valuation in those terms. For some goods,
valuation may be difficult simply because there are no market transactions
from which to measure or infer dollar values. 21 But for others, the probProgramBudgeting in POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 57(A. Ranney ed. 1968); Prest
& Turvey, supra note 15. See generally Williams, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Natural Resources Decisionmaking:An Economicand Legal Overview, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 761
(1979).
18. The traditional economists' definition of efficiency is the "Pareto" criterion,
which holds that a policy is efficient if it makes some people better off without hurting
anyone. Kaldor and Hicks modified this test, contending that a policy is efficient if the
gainers theoretically could compensate the losers. This is the criterion ordinarily employed
in cost-benefit analysis. See Williams, supra note 17. This is true even though losers are not
paid off.
19. An efficiency analysis is not concerned with questions of equity or the distributions of effects, so it is important to acknowledge that a decision adjudged feasible for
cost-benefit purposes is "quite consistent with an economic arrangement that makes the rich
richer and the poor poorer." E. MISHAN, supra note 15, at 13. See Peskin & Seskin,
Introductionand Overview, in CoST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 4-5

(H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1975). 0. ECKSTEIN, supra note 17, at 35-37; Krutilla, Welfare
Aspects of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 69 J. POL. ECON. 226 (1961); S. MAROLIN, PUBLIC
INVESTMENT CRITERIA: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS FOR PLANNED ECONOMIC GROWTH 32-34

(1967). But see A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 69 (1972); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 83-92 (1978); Weisbrod,
Income RedistributionEffects and Benefit-Cost Analysis, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 177 (S. Chase, Jr. ed. 1968). See also Gaffney, Diseconomies Inherent in
Western Water Laws; A California Case Study (Economic Analysis of Multiple Use,
Western Agr. Econ. Research Council Rep. No. 9, Jan. 1961).
20. See text at notes 30-46 infra.
21. See generally Bishop & Cicchetti, Some Institutionaland Conceptual Thoughts on
the Measurement ofIndirectand IntangibleBenefits and Costs, in COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
& WATER POLLUTION POLICY 105 (H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1975); Fisher & Krutilla,
Valuing Long Run Ecological Consequences and Irreversibilities, in COST BENEFIT
ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 271, 283 (H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1975)
(discussing "option" values). Unhappy assumptions abound in the valuation of public
goods. A. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 229-30 (1977). The birds killed in
the Santa Barbara oil spill were valued at one dollar apiece. Tihansky, A Survey of Empirical
Benefit Studies, in COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 159 (H. Peskin
and E. Seskin, eds. 1975) citing W. Mead & P. Sorenson, The Economic Cost of the Santa
Barbara Oil Spill, in University of California, Santa Barbara Oil Symposium (Dec. 16-18,
1970). A day of recreation on the Delaware River has been valued between $.75 and $5.00.
B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 103 n.4 (1974).
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lem is more fundamental: dollars may simply be incapable of capturing the
value which an individual or society places on them. 22 This may be true of
concerns valued in moral or aesthetic terms. The extraordinary protection
provided to endangered species and wilderness areas would be hard to

explain in terms of dollars and cents. And when a24human life is at stake,
moral factors 23 clearly dominate decisionmaking.
The second assumption upon which the measurement of efficiency
depends is that the value of any commodity to an individual is accurately

reflected by his willingness to pay for it.25 .This assumption is, of course,
essential to the reduction of all values to dollar terms. But it relies on the
value judgment that decisions should be made on the basis of one dollar,
one vote. Each individual's preferences
are weighted by the number of
26
dollars he is able to put behind them.
22. See text at notes 39-43 infra. 'W. RowE, THE ANATOMY OF A RISK 146 (1977),
quoting Lederberg, Squaring an Infinite Circle, 27 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 43, 44 (Sept. 1971):
By any rational argument, the health of any individual is a priceless good. This does not set its
value at mathematical infinity, so much as to point out that it is incommensurable with so-called
strictly pecuniary evaluation. . . .Pecuniary estimates are hardly to be taken seriously except to
suggest the scale of a cost benefit analysis. Many citizens may feel that they value their health and
their lives more highly than does the multitude; and they wish to maintain the voluntary option to
strike different bargains in areas that exercise their particular anxieties. It is one thing to advertise
the merits of a transaction; it is another to impose it willy-nilly on the whole population.
23. See note 26 infra.
24. See generally G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 19, at 83-92. The presence
of moral concerns in regulation protecting human health or life is illustrated by the wide
disparity in the costs of risk avoidance that society now tolerates. Accept for the moment
that one life will be saved for every $3 billion invested in hydrogen recombiners in nuclear
power plants, for every $150 million spent on benzene control in the workplace, for every
$2.5 million paid to clean up drinking water, for every $500,000 devoted to reducing the
hazards of upholstered furniture, for every $80,000 spent on seat belts, and for every $30,000
invested in mobile emergency cardiac units. O'Donnell, The Need for a Cost-Benefit
Perspective in Nuclear Regulatory Policy (presented at the Atomic Industrial Forum, Workshop on Reactor Licensing and Safety, New York, May 14, 1979). See Inhaber, Risk with
Energy from Conventional and Nonconventional Sources, 203 ScI. 718 (1979); Starr, Social
Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 ScI. 1232 (1969). Some of this disparity is due to
contrasting assessments of the fairness of certain types of risk creation. For instance, the
Environmental Protection Agency's ambient standards for a variety of toxic substances
average in excess of one hundred times more stringent than OSHA's in-plant standards for
the same substances. W. RowE, supra note 22, at 306. The commonly accepted rationale is
that the "voluntary" exposure of the worker justifies the lesser protection, id. at 306-07,
although EPA must be concerned also with different and more vulnerable populations at
risk. Regardless of the merits of this rationale, it is clear that more than efficiency is being
considered in the setting of minimum health standards.
25. See Williams, supra note 17, at 766-770.

26. See Davidson, The Valuation of Public Goods, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRON345, 351-52 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman, eds. 1972). Reliance

MENT: SELECTED READINGS

on willingness-to-pay of course aggravates the difficulties of placing dollar values on life,
since most of us are unwilling to accept a price for that which we hold most dear. This
theoretical barrier is overcome by recognizing that ordinarily specific victims cannot be
designated in advance, and thus the cost is only a sum to compensate for additional risks of
exposure. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
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Finally, cost-benefit analysis assumes that individuals' willingnessto-pay, in the aggregate, 27 can be measured or inferred from market
prices. For many goods, market prices are simply unavailable, and speculation takes over. But more fundamentally, reliance on the present market
to measure the values of future goods to future generations is a dubious
endeavor. 28 The decisionmaker who uses today's preferences to discount
tomorrow's life is one whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Thus, at the theoretical level, cost-benefit analysis is an appealing
methodology with important limitations. It is appealing because if offers a
calculus that permits reduction of complex policy decisions to easily
comprehensible terms, It is conceptually simple and objective. Yet these
advantages are the source of its limitations. Arguably, it is simple because
it considers only one dimension of human and social values, ignoring
critical moral and aesthetic concerns. Its dedication to hard numbers and
the objective measurement of values leads to a reliance on "willingnessto-pay" and market prices29that bias the analysis against the poor, and
against future generations.
B. PracticalProblems
In addition to theoretical limitations, the use of cost-benefit analysis
in public decisions poses many problems in application. Cost-benefit
analysis requires identification, classification, quantification, monetization, and presentation of the effects of a proposed action. 30 Each of these
five stages is beset by practical difficulties. The initial task of identifying
the likely effects of a proposed action is inherently difficult and the analyst
must often limit arbitrarily the scope of his inquiry. 31 The danger is that
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (S. Chase, Jr., ed. 1966). Of course, where a known life is on

the line a strict view of the theory supports the spending of whatever it takes. Cf. Calabresi,
Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98 DAEDALUS 387 (Spring 1969).

During combat in wartime, the armed forces risk many lives and spend millions to rescue a
single downed flyer caught behind enemy lines. See also note 146 infra.
27. The leap from individual preference to collective rationality is theoretically

hazardous because we have not found a satisfactory way to facilitate comparisons by
attaching cardinal numbers to human values. See A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, supra note
19, ch. 3, discussing the impossibility theorem of K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). See also Introduction, ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
SELECTED READINGS xxxi (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds. 1972) ("the notion that individual utilities can be compared or summed was abandoned long ago"); V. THOMPSON,
DECISION THEORY, PURE AND APPLIED 4-5 (1971).
28. See Krier, The IrrationalNational Air Quality Standards: Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323, 334 n.34 (1974).
29. See Green, The Faked Case Against Regulaiion, Wash. Post, Jan. 21, 1979, § C,
at 1 ("given the state of the economic art, mathematical cost-benefit analyses are about as
neutral as voter literacy tests in the old South"); Lovins, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessments in
Energy Policy, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 911 (1977); HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 9, at 555.
30. See L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
1-2 (1977).
31. In addition, potential effects of alternative policies must be identified, posing
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the analysis may not comprehend important effects or may choose to
ignore them. 32 Even the classification of effects, once identified, as costs
or benefits may depend upon the analyst's perspectives and upon the
valuation techniques used. 33 Despite these difficulties, identification and
classification of the expected effects is a useful exercise, and arguably
essential to rational decisionmaking.
Quantification and monetization of a policy's effects are less clearly
valuable and neither is critical to a rational decision. 34 These procedures
allow the decisionmaker to reduce competing interests to commensurable
terms, thereby simplifying and elucidating the balance he must conduct.
But the analysis is very expensive 35 and, for some kinds of effects,
reduces the quality of information provided to the decisionmaker.
A central problem posed by quantification is that it breeds and
obscures uncertainty. The requirement that all effects be measured in
hard numbers often demands more than social or natural science can
deliver. 36 For instance, potential errors in emissions estimates are compounded by the crude conversion of these figures into estimates of ambient concentration and compounded again in the attempt to use these
estimates to predict the number of deaths or illnesses incurred. 37 Similarly, any attempt to quantify future impacts is further vulnerable to uncer38
tainties about changes in technologies, policies, and human behavior.
The translation of costs and benefits of policy impacts into dollar
terms often calls for imagination, if not clear distortion. Apart from the
fundamental moral and theoretical questions about placing values on lives
and other intangible goods, analysts' attempts to calculate such values are
often clearly misguided. One standard technique for valuing lives, for
severe challenges of technology assessment. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the
Fourth Discontinuity:The Limits of InstrumentalRationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973).
32. See Howard, Matheson & North, The Decision to Seed Hurricanes, 176 Sci. 1191

(1972) (ignoring potentially negative impacts of large-scale injection of silver iodide particles
into the atmosphere).
33. Lovins, supra note 29, at 918-19. For example, in navigational water project

planning, the savings to shippers from the project are counted as a benefit, yet the frequently
concomitant losses to other modes of transportation are not counted as a cost, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1656(a)(1976); 0. ECKSTEIN, supra note 17, at 7. This problem also arises in the valuation
of human lives. See text at note 39 infra.
34. Clark, Cracking Down on the Causes of Cancer, 10

NAT'L

Crocker, Cost-Benefit Analyses of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST

J. 2056, 2059 (1978);

BENEFIT

ANALYSIS &

341 (H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1975).
35. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1975

WATER POLLUTION POLICY

(Sixth Annual Report) 26-28 (1975).
36. See generally Leape, QuantitativeRisk Assessment in Regulation ofEnvironmen-

tal Carcinogens, 4 HARV.
(1978).

ENVT'L

L. REV. 86 (1980); S. EPSTEIN,

37. Leape, supra note 36, at 96-97.
38. E.g., C. CHURCHMAN, PREDICTION

THE POLITICS OF CANCER

AND OPTIMAL DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL

ISSUES OF A SCIENCE OF VALUES ch. 6 (1961); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS chs. 13, 14 (1957); H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY chs. 5, 10 (1968). R. KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, DECISIONS
WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS 12-13, 20-25 (1976);

W. ROWE, supra note 22, at 65-66.
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example, would count as a cost, not a benefit, extension of the lives of the
non-working poor, welfare recipients, and retirees, because they consume
but do not produce.3 9 And who can estimate the dollar benefits
of a
40
twenty percent reduction in diarrhea among newborn infants?
The problems of monetization are compounded by the difficulty of
translating future dollar benefits or costs into present dollars. The choice
of formula for evaluating future dollar effects today, the discount rate, is
essentially a value judgment about equity between generations. 4' No
consensus exists for determining the proper discount rate and a wide
range of rates have been used and proposed. 42 Despite the fact that small
adjustments in the discount rate can have profound effects on the balance
between costs and benefits, 43 no accepted resolution of the discount rate
issue has yet emerged.
Thus, many of the most important effects of policy decisions are
uncertain or intangible. Because cost-benefit analysis demands that all
effects be quantified and valued in dollars, the analyst is often forced to
make estimates and valuations that are arbitrary, simplistic, and distorted
representations of the values at stake. 44 When effects are expressed in
terms that are far abstracted from the terms in which one is used 4to
5
thinking about them, they become less meaningful. Information is lost.
To some extent these problems can be relieved by full explanation of
the assumptions upon which the analysis depends. But the final presenta46
tion of the results of the analysis is often a weak link in the chain.
Frequently, the decisionmaker is not made fully aware of the limits and
the biases of the methodology, and of its application to the problem before
him. This failure is compounded by the fact that uncertainties and potential errors may be obscured by the seeming precision of the final numbers.
Hidden value judgments and arbitrary choices lurk behind the quantified
conclusions.
39. Bishop & Cicchetti, supra note 21, at 112.
40. See Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regulation, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 808 (1975).

41. See M. Baram, supra note 10. at 30-32.
42. Id. For example, discount rates used for planning federal water projects have
ranged from 2- % to 6-Y8%. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION,
THE FUTURE 383-87 (1973); 43 Fed. Reg. 50,276 (1978).

WATER POLICIES FOR

43. Small adjustment in discount rates would reduce 3/of Corps of Engineers water

projects from above parity to below parity. Fox and Herfindahl, Attainment of Efficiency ill
Siltisfying Demands for Water Resources, AMER. ECON. REV., PAP. AND PROCEEDINGS,
198, 202 (1964).

44. See generally M. Baram, supra note 10, at 21-29. Estimates may often reflect the
interests of the estimator. For example, predictions of the number of deaths that would be
prevented by a regulation requiring passive restraining systems in automobiles ranged from
2700 (by General Motors) to 19,000 (by a proponent), HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 9, at 507.
45. For example, an analysis which states that a policy will yield $3 million in
.benefits, may be less informative than the statement that the policy will save 6 lives. See also
K. BOULDING, ECONOMICS AS A SCIENCE 115 (1970).
46. L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, supra note 30, at 2.
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C. The Theory Received
Despite its conceptual and practical frailties, cost-benefit analysis
begins to look better when compared to the obvious alternatives. Uninformed intuition undoubtedly plays a major role in administrative decisionmaking today. In particular, legislative-type judgments by the agencies are classic intuitive balancing acts. Freewheeling power to decide
policy issues was granted to the agencies in the informal rulemaking
provision of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which offers
only the barest assurances that the judgment be informed by anything
other than the "expertise" of the decisionmaker. 4 7 Indeed, informal
rulemaking has become the dominant mode for resolving scientific and
technical issues although the theory of the APA indicates that these
questions were expected
to arise in the adjudicatory context subject to
48
formal constraints.
The years since 1946 have seen enormous advances in decision
theory and practice, including modelling, systems analysis, and costbenefit analysis. Within the context of informal rulemaking, agencies
developed these new techniques to clarify policy options and to elucidate
key decision factors. These tools became increasingly important as
agency agendas were expanded to include "polycentric" problems that
cut across many interests and implicated a variety of disciplines.4 9 They
promised a science of rational choice in complex situations.5 0
Formal decisionmaking techniques, including cost-benefit analysis,
have lent themselves well to the functional needs of agency decisionmaking. They invite modelling and a reasoned expression of future consequences. They sharpen analysis by uncovering assumptions and making
explicit the factors pointing to the comparative advantages of options. 5 '
Even if such techniques do not succeed in selecting the "best" policy,
they do serve to smoke out the "worst" policies-those which inflict
2
more damage and achieve fewer objectives than other available optionsS
While formal decisionmaking techniques serve the functional needs
of the agencies, they are equally serviceable in the promotion of institutional needs. These techniques are greedy for facts,5 3 and they justify
ongoing research programs that must be funded and staffed over time.
They depend upon a technical work force of planners, data processors,
modelers, and laboratory technicians that enhance institutional longevity
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).

48. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: the APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 345, 375-86.

49. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 111, 116-20 (1972),
discussing Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
50. See R. SCHLAIFER, ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1969).
51. Tribe, supra note 31, at 624-625.
52. These are "dominated" alternatives in the parlance of decision theory.
53. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REV. 79 (1959).
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and prestige. The insatiable pursuit of data also facilitates delay and the
avoidance of controversy; any decision dependent upon extensive datagathering promises to be long in incubation and short on results and
controversy. There is always a reason for more facts, and anyone who
says otherwise is presumptively an opponent of rational thought.5 4 The
pursuit of some fictional technically correct "ideal" decision also enhances agency
claims of independence and turns away political second55
guessing.
Finally, cost-benefit analysis and comparable methodologies can
serve to promote agency bias under cover of technical legitimacy. To this
day, the use of cost-benefit methodologies has been associated chiefly
with the federal water construction agencies,5 65 and
that use has been
7
subjected to a continuous drumfire of criticism.
In light of the theoretical and practical shortcomings of cost-benefit
analysis, and the institutional factors influencing its application, it is not
surprising that the cost-benefit practice often departs radically from costbenefit theory. The theory makes little pretense of insight into equity or
income distribution effects, but the practice recognizes that discussion of
the issue is essential.5 8 The theory demands a quantification of all costs
and benefits, but the practice settles for a mere description where intangi54. Many a heady regulatory notion has been brought down by the "more study"
defense. For example, see W. RODGERS, CORPORATE COUNTRY chs. 1, 3, 6, 7, 9 (1973)
(discussing the issues of nonreturnable beverage containers, pollution from copper and
aluminum smelters, phosphates in detergents, and jet noise).
55. See Bruff, PresidentialPower and AdministrativeRulemaking, 88 YALE L. J. 451
(1979).

56. The first legislative imprimatur of cost-benefit analysis appears in the Flood
Control Act of 1936, which conditions water project approval upon a showing that "the
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs." 33 U.S.C.

§ 701a (1976).
57. R. N. McKean's classic work on systems analysis was published more than twenty
years ago, R. McKEAN, supra note 17, and it called attention to popular criticisms of water
project justification. This genre of expose remains in style. See, e.g., Houck, Promises,
Promises:Has Mitigation Failed?, WATER SPECTRUM 31 (Spring 1978); AMERICAN RIVERS
CONSERVATION COUNCIL (and 17 other environmental organizations), DISASTERS IN WATER
DEVELOPMENT II (1977). Fed by a generous supply of agency cost-benefit faux pas,
academic critics have denounced many analyses. See Tihansky, A Survey of Empirical
Benefit Studies, in COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 127, 128 (H.
Peskin and E. Seskin eds. 1975) (analyzing sixty studies: "of the selected studies, less than
30 percent are theoretically valid, but even fewer seem cognizant of the applicability, let
alone existence, of welfare economics."). Case studies have uncovered every conceivable
sleight of hand in cost-benefit miscalculation. Id., at 138-44. See B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSEACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, supra note 21, chs. 6-8; Carlin, The Grand

Canyon Controversy: Lessons for Federal Cost-Benefit Practices, in WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 459 (C. Meyers & A. Tarlock eds. 1971). Justification for some water projects
includes the benefits of water pollution control by dilution, which are sharply questioned by
environmentalist "beneficiaries," and the benefits of recreational use of the reservoir, which
are resisted by recreationalists with other experiences in mind.
58. See L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, supra note 30, at 1, 2; P. SASSONE & W.
SCHAFFER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK ch. 7 (1978); E. MISHAN, supra note
15, at 10.
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bles appear.5 9 The theory is relentless in the pursuit of data, but the
practice recognizes 60that the costs of data accumulation often allow only a
"partial" analysis. This gap between theory and practice, and the consequent possibility of misapplications, confirm the need for increased
control over agency cost-benefit practices. The issue thus becomes how
Congress and the courts should delineate the role formal analysis should
play in agency decisionmaking.
II.

FOUR LEGISLATIVE MODELS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The calls for reform, insisting upon greater attention to the benefits
and costs of government regulatory action, may be answered by Congress
in a variety of ways. Strict cost-benefit analysis as discussed above is only
one way of considering and describing the benefits and costs of particular
policies, standards, or projects. The central policy choice facing Congress
is what directives to give agencies for consideration of benefits and costs.
This section describes four prominent models of legislative instructions
and the normative considerations for their application.
A. The Heretical Model: Cost-Oblivious
"Minimum public health requirements," Judge Campbell has written, "are often, perhaps usually, set without consideration of other economic impact." 6' These cost-oblivious provisions are exemplified by the
national ambient air standards of the Clean Air Act, 62 the fishable/
swimmable criteria of the64Clean Water Act, 63 and a variety of other
well-known prescriptions.
In adopting these provisions, Congress may rely upon a number of
assumptions. Three examples are illustrative. First, Congress may perform an intuitive cost-benefit analysis, estimating that the benefits of
minimum health standards outweigh the costs of attaining them. 65 Agency
consideration of benefits and costs is preempted by Congress's political
assessment of the balance. Second, Congress may forbid the agency from
59. See P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, supra note 58, at ch. 5.
60. E. MISHAN, supra note 15, at 16-17.

61. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 675 (1st Cir. 1974).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(I) (Supp. 11977); see Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution Control in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1058, 1083 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert, eds.

1974).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976). State water quality standards, which allow consid-

eration of economics at the standard-setting stage, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976), illustrate
the cost-sensitive model, discussed below in text at notes 95-120.
64. E.g., the Delaney Clause, of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
65. For a mathematical demonstration that the setting of a standard implies a costbenefit calculation, see Thomas, The Animal Farm: A MathematicalModelfor the Discussion of Social Standardsfor Control of the Environment, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 250 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds. 1972).
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considering costs (even though benefits may not outweigh costs in all
cases) because the transaction costs of performing a formal analysis in
each case would exceed the benefits of the resulting distinctions. This
argument essentially holds that benefits generally outweigh costs, and it
would be "inefficient"66to study all cases in order to find the few instances
where this is not so.
Third, Congress may adopt minimum standards without regard for
even an intuitive cost-benefit analysis, because of a moral judgment that
efficiency considerations are inappropriate in some areas of regulation. 67
This decision reflects the value judgment that, at least where some health
hazards are concerned, the public has a right to a minimal level of
protection regardless of what a cost-benefit analysis suggests. 68 Positive
income distribution effects are freely assumed from health standards,
although the issue is by no means closed, 69 and distributing income in this

fashion is a political goal that is widely shared. 70 Thus, Congress may
choose the policy of spreading health because it values gains to the
winners as more important than losses to the losers.
These policy choices, alone or in combination, may offend notions of
economic efficiency by possibly requiring "overinvestment" in health
and environmental quality. 7 1 But, at least as regards the health-protective

primary ambient air standards, for example, such objections appear
academic, and wrong. Air pollution is a classic case of gross market
failure inflicting substantial 72 health costs on an unwilling population.
66. Doniger, FederalRegulationof Vinyl Chloride:A Short Course in Law and Policy

of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 497, 656 (1979).
67. The Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1976); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651
(1976); S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5175, 5185-86.

68. The uniformity of the national ambient air quality standards is designed to ensure a
rough equality between regions and people. The assumptiorf of equality between regions is
criticized on economic grounds in Zerbe, OptimalEnvironmental Jurisdictions,4 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 193, 202-04 (1974). On the issue of social equity, see B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSEACKERMAN, J. SAWYER, & D. HENDERSON, supra note 21, at ch. 9; Tribe, Legal
FrameivorksforThe Assessment and Controlof Technology, IX MINERVA 243 (No. 2 1971).
69. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1978
(Ninth Annual Report), ch. 10 (1978). Compare B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL HUSTLE
(1979).

70. Recent energy related qualifications of environmental standards invariably purport
to be compatible with the protection of human health. This is true, for example, of com-

pliance date extensions under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5)(B) (Supp. 11977),

and of the Administration's proposals for an Energy Mobilization Board. See The White
House, Specifications for tht Establishment and Operation of an Energy Mobilization
Board, July 19, 1979, at 5. Before the Congress, it is politically difficult even for trade groups
to assert directly that efficiency considerations require the sacrifice of health standards.

71. Krier, supra note 28, at 326-27; Teller, Air Pollution Abatement: Economic Rationality and Reality, 96 DAEDALUS 1082 (1967); Zerbe, sufira note 68, at 212-14.
72. See COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, supra note 69, at 419-20 (reciting estimates of
$5 to $10 billion per year). The threshold assumptions of ambient standards presuppose a
significant payoff in health benefits if the prescribed levels are achieved and maintained. The
case for fixed standards is less persuasive upon acceptance of a linear hypothesis that health
effects vary in direct prdportion to exposure at low levels. See Ruff, FederalEnvironmental
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Significant avoidance of these costs can be expected without shutdowns
of the externality-generating activities. And, in light of the controversy
over the valuation of human health, 73 the assertion that controls may cost
more than the value of health benefits is dubious, dependent entirely upon
the judgment of the analyst.
The exclusion of consideration of cost from agency decisionmaking
offers significant practical benefits for administrative implementation and
subsequent review. An administrative advantage is that agencies are
spared the necessity of attempting a cost-benefit analysis of the standards
set, and can concentrate instead on the more particularized cost judgments involved in attaining those standards. Under the Clean Air Act, for
example, implementation plan development, 74 variances, 75 and enforcement offer focused opportunities for a close and realistic examination of
source costs.
In addition, the adoption of a cost-oblivious health standard frees the
agency from having to make political balances and enables the agency to
produce a set of scientific suppositions around which further debate may
proceed. The cost-oblivious model confines agency standard-setting to
consideration of scientific issues such as dose-effect relationships. Although the line between science and policy may not always be clear, 76 to
the extent that the scientific issues can be isolated, the agency is more
likely to attain consensus on the harms caused by pollution. This, in turn,
will clarify successive policy choices and discourage perpetual relitigation
of basic issues of cause and effect. Where Congress establishes a single
goal for agency action, agency proceedings can be more easily and clearly
structured. Formless and extended proceedings, exemplified by pesticide
cancellations 77 and other regulatory endeavors, can be pruned and
confined.
The presence of factors 78 other than efficiency in legislative deliberations about risk assessment strongly suggests a role for the costRegulation, in SENATE COMM. ON Gov. AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS, App.
to Vol. VI: Framework for Regulation, S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1978). See
also NATIONAL ACAD. OF SCIENCES & NATIONAL ACAD. OF ENGINEERING, COORDINATING
COMM. ON AIR QUALITY STUDIES, REPORT ON AIR QUALITY AND AUTOMOBILE EMISSION
CONTROL, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974) (ambient standards and associated

emission limitations not shown to be economically inefficient although estimates of benefits
do not greatly exceed costs).
73. E.g., Kirschten, Can Government Place A Value on Saving a Human Life? 1979
NAT'L J. 252; R. KEENEY & H. RAIFFA, supra note 38 at 25-26.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (Supp. 1 1977).
75. Id., §§ 7522(b)(1) and 7410(e).
76. McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution
of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J.
729, 733-36 (1979).
77. Id. at 753-54.
78. These include voluntariness, uniqueness, reciprocity, unversality, controllability,
comparability to natural risks and whether the risk is new, government-sponsored or
catastrophic in nature. See generally, W. ROWE, supra note 22, at ch. 8; W. LOWRANCE, OF
ACCEPTABLE RISKS: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY, ch. 3 (1976); Fletcher,
Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). Compare note 24 supra.

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 4:191

oblivious model. Particularly in the context of public health, as the apparent utility of cost-benefit analysis diminishes, the justification for decisive
political intervention grows stronger. Congress should step in to assert
values that escape the efficiency analysis. Cost-benefit theory and practice function poorly where the issue involves significant income redistributior, effects, controversial valuation decisions on life or intangibles,
or judgments on uncertainties. The theory and practice are dysfunctional
where they encourage the pursuit of data that is unlikely to affect the
conclusion or where they approve a delay in a decision to pursue information that is practically unobtainable. These are occasions where decisive
political action is most needed.
B. The Nominal Convert: Cost-Effective
A congressional determination that the benefits of a goal are worth its
costs does not mean that cost-benefit analysis has no role to play. Congress may mandate a formal analysis to determine the most efficient
means for attaining that goal. The use of cost-benefit techniques in this
role is the cost-effective model. With equity factors removed from agency
consideration by prior policy decision, this model is a congressional
directive that efficiency should determine the choice of means. 79 Under
the Clean Water Act, for example, Congress has required that proposals
for municipal sewage treatment plants reflect the most cost-efficient alternative.8 0 The requirement of
cost-effective means also may be implied in
8
other regulatory programs. '
Often, the legislative choice is to leave the decision on means to the
unregulated free market. This makes sense since the cost-effective means
is rarely so obvious or so enduring that it can be discovered easily by the
regulated entity, much less an overseeing agency. 8 2 It is not surprising,
then, that the retention of free market flexibility in the achievement of
environmental or health goals is defended in the legal and economic
literature8 3 as something approaching first principle.
79. T. POISTER, PUBLIC PROGRAMS ANALYSIS: APPLIED RESEARCH METHODS 380-82
(1978).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1292(2)(B) (1976). See also Zener, The FederalLaw of Water Pollution
Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682, 696-702 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds.
1974) (discussing possible differences between cost-benefit balancing, cost-effectiveness
analysis, and other cost tests).
81. For example, the Clean Air Act's new source performance standards, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411 (Supp. I 1977), and the Clean Water Act's technology based effluent standards, 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. I 1977).
82. Rowen, The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER
POLLUTION POLICY 361, 368-69 (H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1975).
83. See, e.g., Roberts and Stewart, Energy and the Environment, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE NEXT TEN YEARS 411, 440-51 (H. Owen & C. Schultze eds. 1976);
Kneese, Costs of Water Quality Improvement, Transfer Functions and Public Policy, in
COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 175, 190-91 (H. Peskin & E. Seskin
eds. 1975).
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Despite this preference for the cost-effective solution of the market,

Congress and its administrative agencies occasionally repudiate free enterprise's choice of the preferred means. Thus, for example, Congress
favors the installation of scrubbers on new coal-fired plants 84 even though
supplementary control systems, using such techniques as dispersion en-

hancement, are said to be less costly. 8s Similarly, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration insists upon technological noise controls
within the plant, 86 even though mandatory employee
earmuffs promise
87
comparable protection at a fraction of the cost.
Several concerns may motivate Congress to reject the market's definition of cost-effective. The cost-effective solutions advanced by trade
groups are often impaired by the same market frailties that inspired
regulation in the first place. They sanction spillover costs by saddling
others with the burdens of control (e.g., workers who are supposed to
wear the earmuffs), and the costs of failure;8 8 they thrive on a lack of
information about the extent of the pollution or health easement. Most
importantly, the market's cost-effective solution is often less effective.
Control of stack gases by supplementary controls depends upon heroic
meteorological predictions and dispersion assumptions that are implausible at best.8 9 The person who is supposed to wear the earmuffs may yield
to the demands of stifling heat, or may prefer to risk a long-term hearing
loss to keep an ear open for the approaching steamroller that deals in

short-term losses of life.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (Supp. 1 1977). See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 3.8 (1977). Compare Ayres & Doniger, New Source Standards for Power Plants II:
Considerthe Law, 3 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 63 (1979) with Badger, New Source Standardfor
Power PlantsI: Consider the Costs, 3 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 48 (1979).
85. See Badger, supra note 84, at 54-57.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1) (1979) (preferring "administrative and engineering controls" over "personal protective equipment"). On OSHA's preference for technological
solutions, see American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 837-838 (3d Cir. 1978).
But see Continental Can Co. v. Marshall, 455 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. IlI. 1978).
87. Hearings on Oversight on the Administration of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 1978, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 315, 323-25
(1978) (statement of the Manufacturing Chemists Association); see Zeckhauser & Nichol,
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration-An Overview, in SENATE COMM. ON
Gov. AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, App. to Vol. VI: Framework for Regulations, S. Doc. No. 14, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 161, 203-04 (1978) (urging OSHA consideration of protective earplugs on basis of report estimating that a 85 dBA standard for hearing
protection could be achieved at annual cost of $43 million, as opposed to $18.5 billion in
capital costs alone if engineering controls are required).
88. Coase has a good idea in asserting that placement of the liability rule makes no
difference where the parties are free to bargain for the least-cost solution to the pollution
avoidance. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). But the
assumption of insignificant transaction costs normally does not hold. See J. HIRSHLIEFER,
PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 449-53 (1976).
89. Compare Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources
Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441, 449-60 (1975) with Stewart,
The Development of Administrative and Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in Judicial Review on
Environmental Decisonmaking: Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713,
736-37 n.118 (1977).
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The importance of an efficient choice of means is reflected in the
literature of regulatory reform insisting upon the least restrictive regulatory option. 90 Only a perverse and punitive spirit calls for the hard and
costly solution over the soft and economical one. The problem, of course,
is that supplementary controls, earmuffs, labeling9 and other costeffectivw options may meet the regulatory goal some of the time. But the
means preferred may be sufficiently unreliable and the prospects of success too problematical to justify acceptance. There is the possibility of a
hidden loss of benefits that may accompany the least restrictive solution,
and Congress should be alert to this possibility.
Finally, the industry quest for the cost-effective solution frequently
fails to consider new technologies because of the large investments required, and the uncertain prospects of capturing the benefits. Congress,
therefore, may design regulatory schemes to remove these disincentives
or to encourage development of new technology. 92 This strategy, too,
requires rejection of the market's cost-effective solution.
Thus, the same considerations that prompt Congress to mandate
goals without consideration of costs may lead also to the repudiation of
even a cost-effectiveness assessment of means. 93 Widespread income
distribution effects, sensitivity to future generations, unanswerable valuation questions, or other uncertainties may encourage the Congress to
dispense with an administrative
inquiry into the hypothetical efficiency of
94
means in certain cases.
C. The PracticingParishioner:Cost-Sensitive
The cost-sensitive model requires that costs be considered by the
agency but stops short of mandating a formal cost-benefit analysis. The
legislative directive is a broad delegation of authority to the agency to
determine what is "feasible, ' ' g "economically practicable, ' 96 or "the
best practicable." 97 The cost-sensitive approach is, along with cost90. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REV. 549 (1979).
91. Labeling is relied upon heavily to prevent pesticide misuse despite longstanding
empirical evidence that people neither read nor heed labels. E.g., DEP'T. OF HEW, REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, PESTICIDES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ENVIRON-

149 (1969).
92. For example, the Clean Water Act offers financial incentives to municipalities to
opt for innovative technology which ultimately reduces the cost of service to the consumer.
33 U.S.C. § 1285(i) (Supp. 1 1977). One criterion for qualifying a design as innovative
technology, in turn, is whether the life cycle costs are reduced by 15%. Innovative and
Alternative Technology Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 35.900, app. E 6(e)(l) (1979).
93. See text at notes 65-70 supra.
94. The Clean Air Act's limited repudiation of tall stacks is illustrative, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7423 (Supp. I 1977), and its non-researchable assumptions suggest that a cost-benefit
analysis would have little to offer.
95. E.g., The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
96. E.g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6344(b)(2) (1976).
97. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1281(b) (1976).
MENTAL HEALTH
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effectiveness, the dominant congressional model for the use of costbenefit analysis; it makes costs pertinent in vague and varying ways to
numerous energy, health, and environmental decisions. 98
The cost-sensitive model enables, and often requires, the agency to
consider a range of factors of congressional interest other than economic
efficiency. Congress may be interested in the equitable effects of regulation on particular constituencies, such as farmers99 or the handicapped. 100
The cost-sensitive model also permits consideration of economic factors
that might escape formal cost-benefit analyses such as restricted consumer choice, 0 1 regional economic benefits,° 2 or impacts on national.
energy consumption. 03 Even where Congress comes close to demanding
formality in the agency decisionmaking process, it may require consideration of factors that 0defy
treatment under even the bolder variations of
4
cost-benefit theory.
The cost-sensitive model serves legislative decisionmaking needs in
a variety of ways. These statutes involve broad delegations which permit
Congress to postpone hard political choices until it has a better understanding of the problem at hand. The first time around, the constituencies
may not be fully mobilized, conflicts are submerged, beneficiaries and
victims mere statistical abstractions, and costs and benefits are blurred
contingencies. In this setting, congressional action dramatizes the problem and gives the impression of action. The agency develops experience
by identifying issues and parties, collecting data, and attempting policy
formations. Congress can then react to the problems in sharper focus,
relying on the interim agency experience for guidance. Congress acts best
as a counterpuncher, and the cost-sensitive and imprecise delegation
helps it work that way.
Another consequence of the cost-sensitive format is its impact on
98. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2002(e) (1976) (setting of fuel economy standards under the
National Energy Conservation Policy Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. 11977) (establishment
of new source performance standards under the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 4916(a)(1)
(1976) (establishing noise standards for railroads under the Noise Control Act).
99. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b) (1976).
See also section 4(b)(1)(C), (F) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15
U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(C), (F) (1976) (protecting agriculture and small refiners under regulations
providing for mandatory allocation of crude oil).
100. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6263(a)(2) (1976) (gas rationing
contingency plan shall include consideration of the mobility needs of the handicapped).
101. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 640-41 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (auto emission standards).
102. The Flood Control Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-2 (1976). Regional benefits
should not be included in a cost-benefit analysis because they represent transfers of income
within the economy and not benefits to the economy as a whole. See also the Water
Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17(c) (1976).
103. While Congress very well might be expected to ask whether the fuel economy
standards will bring savings to consumers that would offset higher auto prices, it was decided
to go further and require consideration also of the "need of the nation to conserve energy."
15 U.S.C. § 2002(e) (1976).
104. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(d) (Supp. 1979).
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agency development of decisionmaking techniques. The broad statutory
delegations often leave open how the goals of the statute are to be
attained, and agencies thus may develop novel approaches to risk assessment. Examples include EPA's Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration (RPAR),105 used in pesticide precancellation proceedings, the Food
and Drug Administration's summary judgment procedures, 10 6 and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's priority system for carcinogens.10 7 Cost-sensitive statutes, by encouraging experimentation with
new tools of decisionmaking, have assisted in the refinement of new
administrative modes of analysis 0 8 and procedure.' 0 9
Congress has many concerns on its collective mind, and directives
that agency regulation be sensitive to costs facilitate consideration of
goals other than pure efficiency. At the same time, however, the broad
delegations characteristic of such statutes give too little guidance to the
agencies, leading to charges of runaway regulation and calls for regulatory reform. I1 0 A greater precision in legislative charters is required,
and is possible. There is considerable room for choice of a substantive'
standard for evaluation of costs falling somewhere between the no consideration test of the air pollution health standards"' and the formal
cost-benefit analysis.' 12 The choice of standard is influenced, no doubt,
by varied assumptions about how closely the regulatory regime should
adhere to the free market's definition of efficiency. At one end of the
spectrum is the authority to set "technologically feasible and economically practicable" industrial energy efficiency improvement
targets, 113 which has been read by the Department of Energy to permit
regulation only where a private firm would be inspired to act under normal
investment criteria.'" 4 At the other end is the criterion for health
105. 40 C.F.R. § 162.6-162.11 (1979).
106. See Ames & McCracken, FramingRegulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CAL. L. REV. 14 (1976).

107. Described in Zeckhauser & Nichol, supra note 87, at 258.
108. E.g., modelling, systems analysis, quality of life indicators, input output, net
energy and risk assessment.
109. E.g., expert hearing officers, conferences, rights of cross examination in hybrid
rule-makings, official notice and findings, summary judgment, and referral procedures.
110.
33 FOOD,
111.
112.
113.

See Cooper, The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Risk-Benefit Decision-making,
DRUG, & CosM. L.J. 755, 766 (1978).

See text at notes 71-73 supra.
See text at notes 121-126 infra.
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6344(b)(2) (1976).

114. The Secretary of Energy, in assessing technological feasibility, asks whether a
particular measure "had been sufficiently accepted by the industry, if it could be implemented on a wide basis before the target date, and if it could bring significant energy
savings without affecting the product produced or the processes used." II U.S. DEP'T

OF

REP. 13 (1978) (DOE(GS-0033)) (Industrial Energy Efficiency Program). That
the government considers regulation under such a circumstance lends credence to the view
that firms do not maximize profits but rather "satisfice"--set up a standard of "good
enough" and accept the first alternative that meets it. See H. SIMON, THE NEw SCIENCE OF
MANAGEMENT DECISION (1977); Simon, A Behavioral Model to Rational Choice, 69 Q.J.
EcoN. 99 (1955).
ENERGY ANN.
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standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("to the extent
feasible . . . no employee will suffer material impairment of health or

functional capacity")" 5 which has been read as requiring all controls
possible to reduce an identified health risk without significant plant closure.' 16 Somewhere in between are the three-tiered technology-based
effluent standards of the Clean Water Act,

17

with nuances of meaning

still unsettled despite years of administrative and judicial experience.
With or without legislative guidance, judicial review can give content

to cost-sensitive directives. Courts generally are agreed that these statutes do not require a formal cost-benefit analysis. " 8 But vague statutory
criteria for consideration of costs have yielded notable differences of
interpretation of identical statutory clauses."

9

Because of the dangers of

broad cost-sensitive delegations, including loss of congressional control
and lack of guidance to the agency, judicial review was intensified. As
discussed below, 20 the judicial hard look is an understandable attempt to
impose some order on the chaotic agency practices masquerading as

applications of formal decision theory. As the accoutrements of "rational
decisionmaking" are assembled and used, it is fully appropriate that

courts closely review what the agency did, how agency techniques work,
whether the data fits the model, and whether the concerns of dissenters

have been addressed.
Thus, the cost-sensitive model, serving several interests, requires
closer control by Congress and the courts. It gives room to the inclinations of the agencies to embrace or refine the formal methodologies. It
115. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
116. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,478 (D.C. Cir. 1974); American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-37 (3rd Cir. 1978); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530
F,2d 109, 122-23 (3rd Cir. 1975). See also Page, Book Review, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1345,
1349-55 (1975). The Fifth Circuit's benzene decision does not require that benefits exceed
costs in a formal sense, 581 F.2d at 502-03, although the standard approved is more generous
to industry than Hodgson by forbidding gross disparities between benefits and costs. Id. at
503. This reading is probably wrong but arguable; the further procedural requirement of the
Fifth Circuit that OSHA develop its own data on benefits is almost certainly wrong.
117. The Clean Water Act is recognized as establishing a three-tiered arrangement
from the 1977 "best practicable" standard (based on the average performance of the best
existing plants) to the 1983 standard of "best available technology economically achievable"
(based upon the best performer and technologies not yet applied) to the new source standard
(which "'should reach farther, require more in the way of extending the frontiers of technology, [and] accord less sympathy to cost consideration," W. RODGERS, supra note 84, at 468).
The 1977 Amendments add a fourth category of best conventional pollutant control technology applicable to non-toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(F) (Supp. I 1977).
118. See CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1976); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974).
119. Compare American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979) (Nos. 78-911, 78-1036) (argued Oct. 10, 1979, 48 U.S.L.W.
3256) with Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-37 (3rd Cir. 1978), and AFL-CIO v. Brennan,
530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3rd Cir. 1975). See also Page, supra note 116, at 1349-55.
120. See text at notes 155-165 infra.
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permits administrative experimentation in risk assessment and procedural innovation. It allows the Congress to buy time, gain better information on costs, benefits and transfers, and use the agencies as policy
lightning rods. Yet the directives from Congress lack specificity as to how
costs are to enter the agency's calculus. A sharper definition by Congress
of an agency's cost-consideration functions and close judicial review are
two appropriate and necessary components of this model.
D. The High Priest: Strict Cost-Benefit Analysis
The model imposing upon agencies the most stringent obligations to
consider costs and benefits is the requirement of a formal cost-benefit
analysis. While intuition suggests that a legislative model embracing a
strict cost-benefit formula might contain an enforceable substantive efficiency standard, the observable consequences are procedural in
nature-requiring better definition, quantification, and a sharper description of alternatives. The most striking feature of cost-benefit analysis is
that it stands out as a technical solution looking for a problem it can solve.
It is impossible to discover a single example of decisionmaking being
reduced to simple computation by a preordained form: if that is the classic
case, it does not exist.
The origins of congressionally-required cost-benefit analyses are
found in early water resource development legislation,' 2 l such as the
Flood Control Act of 1936.122 Historically, congressional requirements of
cost-benefit analyses have been applied to government projects, not to the
development of regulations. Decisions selecting and designing government
projects, unlike regulatory endeavors, are strong candidates for pure efficiency analyses because they involve tasks analogous to the investments
of private firms. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis originally was developed as
a surrogate for private economic decisionmaking to judge the efficiency of
123
projects private firms could not or would not undertake.
Although formal cost-benefit analysis has its roots in the evaluation
of projects, it is now being applied to regulations as well, however imperfectly. Some recent statutes have required a formal assessment of the
costs and benefits of implementing regulations. 124 The Carter Administration, in Executive Order 12,044,125 has demanded that all major regulations be subjected to a rigorous analysis of the burdens imposed upon
121. E.g., The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-154, § 3, 32 Stat. 372
(1902), and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-263, § 2,41 Stat. 1010 (1920).
122. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976).
123. Prest & Turvey, supra note 15.
124. E.g., The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(d)
(Supp. 1979); see H.R. REP. No. 1751, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8160.
125. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978). This Executive Order requires a cost-benefit analysis of
every major regulation and its alternatives. This analysis is performed by the Council on
Wage and Price Stability.
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the economy, and the alternatives available. This executive initiative has

been the single most influential source of formal cost-benefit analysis of
health and environmental regulations to date, but several bills now before
the Congress contemplate sweeping proposals for formal analysis of both
12 6
new and existing regulations.
It is important to note, however, that mandates for formal costbenefit analysis are rarely unqualified; 127 most require consideration of

intangible or equitable factors that cannot possibly be incorporated into a
pure efficiency analysis. Recent laws 28 and regulations 129 governing
water resource projects, for example, have specified that the cost-benefit

analysis required by the Flood Control Act of 1936130 be supplemented by
discussions of the effects of the proposed project on environmental quality, regional development, and social well-being.' 3' Even Executive
Order 12,044 requires only that the formal analyses be considered in the
32
regulators' final decision. 1
The most pervasive statutory source for cost-benefit analysis is the

environmental impact statement requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 133 NEPA does not require a cost-benefit
analysis in specific terms, but courts have found such a requirement in the
statute, 134 though they disagree on the formality required in the analysis 135 and the proper scope of review. 136 Strong arguments favor a formalized cost-benefit obligation under NEPA. A more formal analysis puts
the agency under tighter restraints, so it is not surprising that both en126. See note 7 supra.
127. E.g., the Secretary of Energy must determine whether benefits of a proposed
energy efficiency standard exceed the costs, but must also consider effects on competition
and energy conservation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6295(d) (Supp. 1979).
128. Flood Control Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-2 (1976).
129. Water Resources Council, Principles and Standards for Planning Water and
Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,778 (1973), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 72,978
(1979).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1976). See Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to
Public Investment Decisions, 80 Q.J. ECON. 208, 212 (1966) (statutory standard of "benefits
to whomsoever they may accrue" does not specify efficiency benefits to the exclusion of
equity benefits).
131. This multi-objective approach in water resource planning is discussed in Jaffe,
Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective Evaluation of Federal Water Projects, 4 HARV.
ENVT'L L. REV. 58 (1980).
132. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
134. The leading case is Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
135. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50, 57 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), affd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974) vith
Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 521 (N.D. Ala. 1973). See Rosen, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Judicial Review, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 7 ENVT'L L. 363
(1977); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972).
136. Compare Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240-241
(W.D. Mo. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974) with Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1134 (5th Cir. 1974).
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vironmentalists 37 and industry 138 urge cost-benefit formality as a part of
NEPA obligations. Moreover, NEPA requires that the agency discuss
alternatives, 39 and cost-benefit theory points to the selection of the best
one. Even recent Supreme Court decisions, narrowing the scope and
content of the impact statement obligation, 40 have aided indirectly the
applicability of cost-benefit principles which work best in comparing
narrow-gauged, short-term options.' 4 ' NEPA, it deserves emphasis, influences the charter of most of the agencies, 4 2 so any governmental
agency inclined to undertake cost-benefit
inquiries could be expected to
143
invoke NEPA as supporting authority.
Agency experience under NEPA points the way towards a substantive environmental protection through, perhaps, an intuitive adherence to
cost-benefit theory. The theory of welfare economics, upon which costbenefit analysis is based, embraces the restrictive Pareto criterion of
efficiency as a substantive aim (approving that policy which helps some
without hurting others) and at the same time confesses an inability to deal
with interpersonal comparisons of utility. 144 The theoretical threat to a
chosen project is thus a veto by individual opponents 45 whose extraordinarily high utility for a resource in jeopardy can force significant changes
in projects or policies. 46 Government officials call this high utility opposi137. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 827 (5th Cir. 1975).
138. E.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (1973), after
remand, 513 F.2d 506 (1975); cf. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 14-15, 29-30 (D.C. Cir.

1976).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), (E) (1976).

140. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551-53 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
141. See, e.g., Prest & Turvey, supra note 15, at 728-31; cf. Hitch, Operations
Research and National Planning-A Dissent, 5 OPERATIONS RESEARCH 718 (Oct., 1957)

("The sort of simple explicit model which operations researchers are so proficient in using
can certainly reflect most of the significant factors influencing traffic control on the George
Washington Bridge, but the proportion of the relevant reality which we can represent by any
such model or models in studying say, a major foreign-policy decision, appears to be almost
trivial.").
142. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 606
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
143. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS-AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL AGENCIES

51 (1976) (Table 12).
144. See 0. ECKSTEIN, supra note 17.

145. Wildavsky, supra note 17, at 55, 59. See also J.

RAWLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

(1971).
146. Thus, Indian fishing opportunities may be enhanced by a determined and committed minority (see Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 3055 (1979)), and whaling policies modified by single-minded demonstration
(see Paul Watson, Angry Shepherd of the Seas Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1979, at BI, col. I re

ramming of outlaw whaling vessels). Many of the best known environmental victories are
attributable chiefly to strong opposition by an individual or small group, e.g., the Grand
Canyon (David Brower), and DDT (Rachel Carson). See Sive, EnvironmentalDecisioninaking: Judicialand PoliticalReview 28 CASE W. L. REV. 827, 828 (1978). My own list would

include the grizzly bear (Lewis Regenstein, Friends of Animals), stripmining legislation
(Louise Dunlap, Center for Environmental Policy), Storm King Mountain (David Sive), and

DDT (Charles Wurster, Environmental Defense Fund).
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tion the "squawk" factor, and they respond to it. 147 The NEPA corollary
of this application of cost-benefit theory is reflected in the NEPA doctrine
of mitigation.
Thus, NEPA's dominant substantive standard is that of maximum
mitigation, which requires best efforts to avoid damage and all possible
action to mitigate it. 48 One of its important features is the linkage between project plans and mitigation, 49 reflecting some impatience with a
merely potential optimum where gainers could compensate losers. 10 This
judicially created mitigation or compensation function is reflected
elsewhere in legislation where Congress has established formal mechanisms to pay off losers even where not constitutionally required,' 5 ' or at
least to require preparation of mitigation plans. 5 2
Buying off the full measure of wrath is impossible. The appropriate
level of reparations payments to nonconsenters is not easily found. The
hatchery in lieu of the natural salmon run will satisfy the mild opponents,
moderate the strong, and isolate the fixed. The aim is to turn down the
squawk, not shut it off; mitigate, not obviate. While cost-benefit theory is
vulnerable to those with a high personal utility, the practice must search
for a tolerable compromise.
Cost-benefit theory thus breaks down due to its own success in
determining who bears the costs. As soon as the analysis identifies winners and losers, the concerns of the losers must be addressed. The logical
conclusion is that any theory, and perforce any practice purporting to
produce a "best" policy for society, must address both efficiency and
equity concerns. That proposition has been a sore point to cost-benefit
theorists, but it has been grasped readily by many cost-benefit practitioners. 153
Under NEPA, of course, the procedural consequences far outweigh
the substantive. 154 The impact statements have become elaborate findings
requirements. The obligations to consult, consider, and explain are
strictly enforced. This result seems a natural response to the strict costbenefit model. The application of capital investment theory to the intangibles and non-market values of the environment could hardly be expected
147. W. ROWE, supra note 22, at 63-65.
148. W. RODGERS, supra note 84 § 7.5, at 747-50 (1977); see Rosen, supra note 135.
The Supreme Court has not been a staunch supporter of a substantive NEPA. See Strycker's
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S. Ct. 497 (1980) (per curiam).
149. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972);
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 721 (1978).
150. Krutilla, supra note 19, at 227 ("To claim that welfare has increased when the ex
ante distribution is not automatically preserved by the mechanism of intervention, requires
that those who gain are able to and do compensate those who lose, and still have something
remaining") (emphasis in original); see also G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITr, supra note 19, at
83-92.
151. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 79c (1976) (Redwoods National Park).
152. See, e.g., Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662(b) (1976).
153. See text at notes 58-60 supra.
154. See, e.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S. Ct. 497
(1980) (per curiam).
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to lead ineluctably to the optimal decision. What is picked up by the
agencies are the habits of formal inquiry, not the consequences of formal
analysis.
In sum, the strict cost-benefit model may illuminate both the problems which confront an agency and the processes by which it resolves
those problems, but it fails to command a result. The model is most useful
when the principal interests at stake are primarily economic. Tradeoffs
among interests that can be easily quantified are assisted by cost-benefit
analysis. The formal cost-benefit model, therefore, works best in consideration of government projects, where it is closely analogous to the
analysis typical of private investment decisions. The NEPA experience,
however, indicates that the legislative choice of the formal model will be
chiefly of procedural significance. This is emphatically true in the context
of health and environmental decisionmaking.
III. OVERSIGHT OF COST-BENEFIT DECISIONMAKING

Structuring agency consideration of costs in formulating environmental policy is only part of the challenge of regulatory reform. The choice of
the legislative model, including the decision to banish cost considerations
entirely, must proceed with an understanding of how courts may respond
to the cost-benefit exercises of the agencies. It is thus useful to inquire
anew into once-settled habits of judicial review, which are being revised
again in light of agency experience with the techniques of formal decisionmaking.
A. Hard Look Conventions
The disparity between the theory and practice of cost-benefit analysis
reviewed in part I of this article suggests a need for judicial oversight. The
theory requires a large number of value choices and assumptions. It deals
unsatisfactorily with several policy challenges, including intangibles, future generations, and nonconsenting individuals. The practice embraces
the theory in a number of particulars (by quantification, identification of
consequences, and reduction of probabilities to present values), and departs from it in others (by addressing equity concerns and passing over
intangibles). What emerges is a hodgepodge, consistent neither in theory
nor practice. Different analysts, different results, is not the scientific
expectation, 5 5 but it is the cost-benefit practice.
Confronted by these shortcomings, it is not surprising that the hard
look doctrine of judicial review has flourished under a variety of costbenefit regulatory schemes. 156 The central feature of this legal doctrine is
155. R. ACKOFF, SCIENTIFIC METHOD: OPTIMIZING APPLIED RESEARCH DECISIONS
ch. 1 (1962).
156. The hard look originally developed as a mode of judicial review of agency
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a persistent demand for reasoned decisionmaking by administrative agen-

cies.' 57 The courts require an agency to identify its sources of authority
and to disclose information gaps, value choices, and assumptions relied

upon in the decision. Courts expect the agency to explain how its analyses
were conducted and used in the decision. Occasionally, they will require

an agency to complete an inquiry it has purported to undertake-by
addressing soft spots highlighted by the objections of losers, by producing
an explanation
where one is called for, or by gathering data on a central
issue.15 8
This close scrutiny review has permitted limited judicial policing of
agency cost-benefit practice, most notably in the context of the National
Environmental Policy Act. Courts have demanded better description of
alternatives,' 5 9 and improved explanations of methodology. 160 They have
demanded disclosure' 6' and even quantification of certain costs 162 and
benefits. 63 They have sought reasons for questionable valuation decisions 164 or the choice of a particular discount rate. 165 But although hard
look review freely asks what was done and why at all stages of the
cost-benefit exercise, the intervention is circumspect, and criticisms often
take the form of quarreling with departures from widely accepted decorum (inconsistency, deception, or pregnant omissions). The focus of
the hard look is to understand what the agency did, as a prelude to testing
that action against congressional purposes, not to reassess the judgments

bound up in any cost-benefit inquiry.
adjudicatory action, Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), but has since become the dominant mode of review for
agency legislative rulemakings as well, Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
157. See, e.g., Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of
Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805 (1978). See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
158. Rodgers, supra note 157, at 707, citing authorities.
159. See, e.g., Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (alternative of
delay must be considered); Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Compare
Rodgers, supra note 157, at 724-726.
160. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 521 (N.D. Ala. 1973); International Harvester v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
161. See, e.g., Smeltzer v. Adams, 11 ENVIR. REP. CASES 1367, 1372 (N.D. Iowa
1978).
162. Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat, 457 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mont. 1978) affdin part,
rev'd in part, on other grounds, 594 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1979); see Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d
465, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reserves decision on whether it is reasonable to proceed without
quantitative estimates of costs and benefits).
163. See, e.g., Smeltzer v. Adams, I1 ENVIR. REP. CASES 1367 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
164. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1325-32 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, 11
ENVIR. REP. CASES 1123, 1127 (E.D. La. 1977).
165. See Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394, 399
(M.D. Penn. 1975), rev'd., 537 F.2d 29 (3rd Cir. 1976); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp.
517, 532 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
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B. Soft Glance Departures
While the erratic practice of cost-benefit analysis has encouraged
rigorous judicial review on matters of presentation and description, it is
clear that courts are limited in the extent to which they may intervene to
correct perceived errors in a cost-benefit analysis. When agencies employ
new techniques of formal decisionmaking, address matters on the farthest
reaches of human knowledge, and espouse value choices that judges have
no authority to contradict, judicial review is inevitably constrained. One
would expect a review that tolerates experimentation, understands gaps
in information, and approves improvization while methodologies develop.
Consequently, in the midst of a great body of close scrutiny case law
appear uncharacteristic examples of "kid glove" 66 review, giving administrators considerable room to make policy judgments and risk assessments without factual support where none exists. Perhaps the best
known of this genre is the en banc opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, 167 where the court
sustained health-justified reductions in the lead content of gasoline additives with these observations:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to come

by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public health, and the

decision that of an expert administrator,
we will not demand rigorous
68
step-by-step proof of cause and effect.'

This deference occurs often in cases involving attacks on health 69 or
environmental 70 regulations, where the agency's charter permits it to
make legislative or predictive judgments necessary to protect the public
against possible threats to health. Tolerant judicial review of agency
policy choices, as distinguished from agency adjudicatory findings, has
17
been exercised elsewhere, when the agency action is frankly tentative, 1
172
admittedly experimental,
or otherwise hedged by uncertainties.173 In
166. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061, 1071 (5th Cir. 1975).
167. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
168. Id. at 28.
169. E.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (asbestos
dust); Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975) (vinyl chloride); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd
Cir. 1978), petition for cert. pending, Nos. 78-918 and 78-919 (coke oven emission).
170. E.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestos); cf.
Rhodia Inc. v. Harris County, 470 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (injunction for the
dumping of arsenic wastes).
171. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 925 (1977) (heptachlor and chlordane).
172. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
173. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(court "cannot wear blinders in a litigation involving an ongoing administrative process, and
its ruling and relief must take account of the world as it exists as of the time of the decree").
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these cases, the courts ensure the agency action is a well-reasoned effort
to implement the congressional charter, but permit judgmental freedom.
A common feature of these soft glance instances of deference to the
agency policy choice is that they deal with uncertainty about risks, benefits or policy directions. Uncertainty presents grave theoretical and
practical challenges to any cost-benefit calculus because it forces subjective estimates of change that may undercut the objectivity of other elements of the analysis. 174 Uncertainty is also likely to precipitate conflict
between the dominant legal mode of conflict resolution (which assumes an
ordered sequence of events with a single definite point of termination and
a static answer) and the realities of agency decisionmaking which tend
towards incrementalism, experimentation, gradual redefinition of rules of
behavior, and resistance to final solutions. 175 Judicial restraint in the face
of administrative resolution of uncertainty is expected and proper. It is
clear that rational and formal models of thought cannot replace all judgment, nor eliminate value choices. Truly creative decisionmaking, which
pursues benefits with values not yet known, is ill-suited to evaluation by
formal analysis. 176 The best thinking, within administrative agencies as
elsewhere, requires intuition about present realities and future events. 177
Courts can hardly set in concrete what the agencies etch in clay.
There is a need also to protect the traditional power of the agencies to
make policy, in short, to legislate, especially on issues of health and
safety. There is an uncomfortably large range of issues which, although
susceptible to being posed as questions of fact, cannot practicably be
answered by science. 178 Where regulators must assess the significance of
highly improbable catastrophic events or the biological effect of low-level
pollutant exposures, prediction, and action based upon it, may be indispensable to the interdiction of sudden, pervasive, and irreversible damage, or the recognition of subtle and gradual damage. Evidence of risk
often accumulates only incrementally and speaks in muted ways to experts who can read the signs. The points of difference between data of
174. See Green, The Resolution of Uncertainty, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 182, 184

(1972).
175. Bauer, The Study of Policy Formation:An Introduction, in THE STUDY OF
POLICY FORMATION 18 (1968); cf. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). The dispositive adjudication is unlikely as continuing
improvements in knowledge repudiate assumptions about uncertainty governing earlier

decisions.
176. See V. THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 5-7; Back, Decisions Under Uncertainty:
Rational, Irrational,and Non-rational, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Feb. 1961, at 14, 16-18;
Patchen, Decision Theory in the Study of NationalAction: Problems and a Proposal, 9 J.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 164 (1965).
177. See, e.g., Wilder, The Role of Intuition, 156 Sci. 605 (1967).
178. This is true of two of the more common types of environmental and health
controversies. One is the probability of extremely improbable events which cannot be

determined by limited histories or involve estimates not envisaging all modes of failure. The
second is the biological effect of low-level pollution exposures, since it is impossible to

prove with any finite experiment that any environmental factor is "totally harmless." See
generally Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
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mild concern, growing suspicion, and serious moment are judgmental,
and hardly susceptible to judicial redefinition. Moreover, the resolution of
uncertainty in the context of health and safety regulation proceeds without the accummulated experiences of, for example, the business world in
resolving economic uncertainties. These new regulatory practices of valuing life, wilderness or reduced morbidity or choosing discount rates are
intellectual adventures in areas without precedent, and thus hardly susceptible to close direction by judicial overseers.
A rule of necessity, then, counsels a judicial deference to administrative judgments that are not practicably supportable by facts. Nor, indeed,
in so doing must the courts stand convicted of collusion in runaway
administrative excesses, although they will be accused of this.' 79 This
obligatory restraint may be explained as a recognition of the inherent
judicial limitations that led to the demise of substantive due process. 18 0 It
is important to acknowledge that issues of fundamental policy, including
assessments of low-level pollution and of the probability of extremely
improbably events, eventually gravitate to the Congress.' 8' A judicial
determination refusing to look behind an administrative "policy" judgment, after all, is but a remand to the legislature for further considera82
tion.
The inevitable appearance of soft glance judicial review, in tandem
with the hard look, places the agencies' cost-benefit methodologies in a
new perspective. Courts can be relied upon to uncover what is done in the
name of cost-benefit analysis and to encourage at least marginal improvements in presentation and description. But the courts cannot come
close to imposing consensus standards of adequacy; nor can they look
behind the fundamental and numerous judgments involved in identifying,
classifying, quantifying, and expressing in present dollar values the effects of a policy action.' 8 3 These limits of judicial review reaffirm the
legislative obligation to recognize occasions where cost-benefit analysis
functions poorly, as in matters of high uncertainty, and thus should be
dispensed with in favor of the cost-sensitive model, where the parties and
the agency can share the burdens of prediction, or in favor of the costoblivious model, where the agency is relieved altogether of the obligation
of establishing benefits. These limits suggest also that other mechanisms
may serve to mediate the degree of formality required in agency decisions. Prominent for these purposes is the placement and definition of the
burdens of production and persuasion.
179. See Cooper, The Role of Regulatory Agencies in Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking,
33 FOOD, DRUG, & COSM. L. J. 755, 766-69 (1978).
180. Speech by J. Skelly Wright, Judicial Review and the Equal Protection Clause, at

the Harvard Law School (Oct. 1979).
181. See, e.g., Hearings on Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident Before Senate Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
182. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
183. See text at notes 30-46 supra.
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C. Burdens of Uncertainty
With the outcome often depending upon the resolution of uncertainty, it is not surprising that the assignment of the burdens of coming
forward and of persuasion may control the substantive result. Congress
may use burdens of proof to allocate the risks of inaction and of lack
of information, and to structure judicial review of agency policymaking.
When such congressional specifications are lacking, courts may invoke
the doctrines of burdens of proof to implement the basic mandates of the
statute.
The Administrative Procedure Act says only that in formal rulemakings, "except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or
order has the burden of proof." 184 This burden, however, applies only to
the burden of coming forward with evidence and not to the burden of
persuasion, 8 - and may, in any event, be subject to different statutory
mandates. 18 6 In the absence of such an explicit mandate, the law of notice
and comment rulemakings is that the burden of production is on the party
with the special expertise or access to the disputed information.18 7 Courts
assume that in a reviewing court, the burden of showing that a rule is
arbitrary or capricious is on the challenger of the rule. 8 8
The Congress, then, and the courts in plumbing a subject often
addressed only by implication, have a free hand in addressing the burdens
of uncertainty that influence the outcome of formal decisionmaking. Both
the delineation of burdens in a statute and the course of subsequent
judicial review will be influenced by the substantive charter of the statute.
Sharp differences, for example, appear along a spectrum of legislative
choices from the demanding Delaney Clause, which bans any food additive causing cancer in test animals,' 8 9 to imprecise statutes such as the
Atomic Energy Act which approves a rather open-ended risk assessment.' 90 Within these substantive limits, three models of the legislative
184. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976).
185. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977) (holding that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide

Act imposes the burden of establishing safety on the registrant in proceeding to suspend the
registration of a pesticide).

186. Id.
187. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6:15, at 520 (2d ed. 1978).
188. Id.

189. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(c)(3)(A), 376(b)(5)(B), 360(d)(1)(H) (1976) (food additive, color
additive, and animal drugs, respectively). Compare Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical
Naivet and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulationof Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 1084 (1974) with Turner, The Delaney Anticancer Clause: A Model Environmental
ProtectionLaw, 24 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1971), and Comment, Implementing the Anticancer
Clauses of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1977). For a
definitive analysis, see Merrill, Regulating CarcinogensIn Food: A Legislator's Guide to
the Food Safety Provisionsof the FederalFood, Drug and CosmeticAct, 77 MICH. L. REV.
171 (1978).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976); see 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(a) (1979). On the importance of
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treatment of regulatory burdens of uncertainty appear although they represent not so much dominant categories as they do prominent points on a
spectrum of possibilities.
1. Least Restrictive: Economic Regulation and the Free Market
Presumption
In some cases Congress assumes that the unregulated status quo is
the norm, and imposes heavy burdens of production and persuasion upon
agencies advocating departures from that norm. Agencies must come
forward with essential data needs, and must make a convincing case for
the proposed action. The standards are set high, because the risks of
inaction do not offset the potential disruptions of intervention.
Under a high burden of production, lack of information can defeat
agency initiatives. Regulations or projects are conditioned upon the completion of studies not in hand or even underway. Since analyses suitable
for regulatory purposes are unlikely to be undertaken by experts without a
regulatory purpose, this approach anticipates a lengthy period of study
before restrictions are imposed. Theoretically, the model can preclude all
regulation if answers to the uncertainties are unavailable and unobtainable. 19 1 More likely, the fixation on resolving uncertainties is likely to
make regulation difficult, time-consuming, and occasional. But, by assumption, the costs of regulation delayed are more than offset by the
benefits of market dislocations avoided.
The assumption that data is obtainable takes seriously the quantification needs of formal decisionmaking. The model is thus best suited to
regulatory contexts where cost-benefit analysis is useful: instances of low
uncertainty, accessible market prices, and meaningful dollar valuations. 1 92 Decisions are assumed to be made on the basis of factual determination. This model is appropriate also to government investment decisions such as water projects where the consequence of expenditure without proof of benefits may be an unwise public investment.
In some cases under this model, Congress may establish a burden of
production which requires affirmative study, as distinguished from collection and analysis of what is available, as a prerequisite to agency action.
This decision to require more data is conceptually similar to the decision
to require cost-benefit analysis, 193 and will be guided by similar normative
considerations. Further study of efficiency details may be irrelevant when
the decision is likely to turn on income distribution factors, or unverifiable
guesses about values or uncertainties. More study also means more costs,
the precision of the mandate for purposes of judicial review, see Rodgers, Developments 1i
Environmental Law and Procedures, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 81 F.R.D. 310 (1978).
191. See Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 392 (1974).
192. See text at notes 121-123 supra.
193. See text at notes 65-70 supra.
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and in appropriate cases, these must94be weighed against the benefits of
information and the costs of delay.
NEPA offers an example of congressional imposition of a high burden of production. The NEPA cases point to occasions where affirmative
study is the reasonable predecessor of action if the data is within reach,
the answers crucial, and the costs of securing the answers tolerable. 9 5
In light of NEPA's powerful commitment to study and documentation, 96 however, it is unlikely that a pure efficiency calculus governs the
length and detail of impact statements.
Congress may also protect the status quo by imposing upon the
97
agency the burden of persuasion. The celebrated Bumpers amendment'
198
is illustrative. It would overrule the predominant current practice
by
requiring agencies to assume the burden of supporting their rules by a
preponderance of evidence in a reviewing court. But by imposing this
burden on all agency actions, the Bumpers amendment would cripple
many administrative initiatives. It invades the arena of permissible administrative judgment by approving a standard of judicial review that presupposes factual support where, in many cases, none may exist. 199 It discourages agencies from making policy judgments that the risks of inaction
in the face of uncertainty exceed the risks of action. It erodes the manufacturers' traditional burden of proving safety by imposing an uncertain,
and manipulable burden of justification on the agency. And it restricts
congressional ability to delegate power to an agency to do what Congress
could do itself. In short, the Bumpers amendment adopts the principles of
the free market model, and applies them willy-nilly, to a broad range of
issues for which they are inappropriate.
The free market model was similarly misapplied by the Fifth Circuit
in the benzene case.200 The court held that a benzene standard of 1 ppm
194. K. BOULDING, supra note 45, at 65-66, H. RAIFFA, supra note 38; McGarity, supra
note 76, at 736-740. See also Green, supra note 174, at 184.
In the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, for example, Congress explicitly
provides that:
The Administrator, in establishing standards for data requirements for the registration of pesticides with respect to minor uses, shall make such standards commensurate with the anticipated
extent of use, pattern of use, and the level and degree of potential national volume of use, extent
of distribution, and the impact of the cost of meeting the requirements on the incentives for any
potential registrant to undertake the development of the required data.
7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
195. See note 158 supra.
196. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(A), (B), (C), (E) (1976).
197. S. 111, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), approved by the Senate as an amendment to
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1971, 125 CONG. REC. S12,131-67, S12,171-72 (daily
ed. Sept. 7, 1979).
198. See text at notes 155-165 supra.
199. See text at notes 168-177 supra.
200. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
440 U.S. 906 (1979) (Nos. 78-911, 78-1036) (argued Oct. 10, 1979, 48 U.S.L.W. 3256).
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could not be supported by substantial evidence in the absence of a factual
showing that benefits bore a reasonable relationship to costs. Answering
this question would require low level epidemiological exposure studies
(which did not exist, would take years to complete, and in all likelihood
would be inconclusive); construction of a valid dose-response curve for
high concentration human exposure studies permitting projection of
cancer risks at lower exposure levels (which is beyond the state of present
knowledge); or additional animal studies (which had been unsuccessful to
date). 20 1 The court said, "Until such estimates [of benefits] are possible,
OSHA does not have sufficient information to determine that a standard
such as the one under review which it can only say might
202 protect some
worker from a leukemia risk is reasonably necessary."
The decision is a misapplication of the free market model and pays
the price of a poor fit. In the face of serious risks of inaction, the court
imposed unrealistic data requirements and assumed the possibility of20 3a
reliable resolution of uncertainty and a workable efficiency calculus.
Unfortunately the context in which this model is applied is one where data
is short, uncertainty high, and predictive judgment at a premium.
Thus, wholly apart from whether health and safety standards under
OSHA must be justified by a formal cost-benefit analysis, 20 4 the Fifth
Circuit in the benzene case seems clearly wrong in conditioning the
ambient regulation upon the completion of studies not now possible and
only remotely foreseeable. Given the uncertain state of the predictive art,
the resistance of the problem to analytical solution, and the consequences
of a wrong choice, 20 5 a better reading of the legislation is to leave room for
predictive administrative ventures. This calls for a standard of proof that
ordinarily can be met by evaluation of the data in hand. The state of the
art model offers such a standard.
2. State of the Art
The state of the art model embraces the assumption that the unregulated market isthe norm but deviations from this norm are plausible and
expected. This model strikes a balance between the informational demands of formal decisionmaking, and the regulatory need to escape a
paralysis of fact. It embraces a standard of proof that tolerates uncertainty, and thus seeks pragmatically the best decision for the moment. It
201. Id. at 504.
202. Id. at 504-05.

203. Note that the court also applied hard look habits of judicial review, suitable for
probing what was done, to issues of agency policy judgments which should have been given
a soft glance.
204. The presence of high uncertainty suggests that Congress actually opted for the
cost-sensitive model, discussed in text at notes 95-120, supra.

205. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Indeed, sometimes the
last thing we want is epidemiological experimentation on the population at large. See S.
EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 59.
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anticipates a decision with data already known, requiring only that agencies use the best available evidence in reaching judgments.
Under this model, the assignment of the burden of production tends
to be a pragmatic matter, with the party possessing information being the
one expected to produce it. There is some authority, for example, for the
proposition that agencies must produce pertinent data on environmental
issues without regard to the advocacy initiatives of the parties. 20 6 Once
the agency has established doubts about the safety of a practice (i.e., a
prima facie showing of market failure), the formal burden of persuasion
ordinarily is shifted to the perpetrator of the risk, on the assumption that
high spillover costs are unacceptable.
The state of the art burden model is the preferred model of choice for
health and safety regulatory judgments. It works well in conjunction with
the cost-sensitive legislative model discussed in part II. It avoids both a
paralysis of indecision and unsubstantiated guesswork by permitting action on the basis of present knowledge but with consideration of incompatible data. It accommodates the policy needs of both the hard look and
soft glance.
This model of assignment of burdens of production and persuasion is
illustrated by a series of cases challenging health regulations promulgated
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 20 7 In each case, the
agency had formulated standards on the basis of its assessment of the data
available. The courts upheld the predictive judgments of the agency since
the industry failed to persuade the court that the standards were infeasible. In the asbestos case, for example, the agency was free under its
charter to make a judgment about the degree of protection required,
leaving to the industry the burden of persuasion on the issue of infeasibility. 20 8 This is the analysis which should have been followed in the benzene case.
A difficult issue under the state of the art model is to reconcile
industry's burden of persuasion of proving safety, entitlement to exemption, or the like, with the government's obligation to justify regulatory
action, which has become an integral feature of hard look judicial review.
In the well-known InternationalHarvester case, 20 9 industry had the burden of persuading the court that effective control technology was unavailable to earn a suspension of the auto emission standards. At the same
time, the hard look doctrine imposed upon the Environmental Protection
Agency the obligation to come forward with "a reasoned presentation
of the reliability of a prediction and methodology that is relied upon to
overcome a conclusion, of lack of available technology, supported prima
206. See Rodgers, supra note 157, at 718-24.

207. See note 169 supra. These cases also focused on the legislative charter to OSHA,
which was interpreted to permit predictive judgments.
208. Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

209. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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faciely by the only actual and observed data available, the manufacturers'
testing." 210 Because the Administrator failed to make such a presentation, under hard look review a remand was required.
InternationalHarvester walks a fine line in encouraging formal decisionmaking that works. The danger is that the hard look doctrine's
requirement of reasoned justification of agency methodologies may tend
to shift the burden of proof to the agencies, thus obliterating the legislative
choice in placing the burden of persuasion of safety or entitlement to
exemption upon the regulated entity. In the first place, it encourages a
relaxation of the standard of proof, and suggests only a reasonable production on the matter at issue. But the standard may demand more, and
exact the penalty of defeat for nonproduction, and a turning of the head
from the problem at hand. Second is the problem of deciding where the
close justification of methodology leaves off and the discretion to make
policy judgment on matters of uncertainty begins. This is the fine line
between the hard look and the soft glance, and it turns chiefly on the
difference between requiring explanation and accepting judgment.
3. Most Restrictive: Regulation of Dangerous Substances and the
Market FailurePresumption
This model rejects the norm of the unregulated marketplace, and
presupposes that intervention is the rule, typically on the rationale of
market inability to control high spillover costs. It is a model suspicious of
the workings of free market innovations, and is ready to sacrifice potential
technological improvements to head off potentially damaging initiatives.
This model is the converse of the free market model in that it also
takes seriously the data needs of formal decisionmaking, except that the
burden of overcoming uncertainties rests upon the proponent of the
proposed activity. The standard is set high because the possible severe
health consequences of approval, presumptively at least, are not offset by
disruption of current economic interests. The party who proposes to
introduce a new technology into the market must establish the safety of
the initiative under a high standard of proof. The paradigms of the model
are provisions of the drug and pesticide laws ,21 which require proponents
210. Id. at 648.
211. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (Supp. II 1978) (pesticide registration); 21 U.S.C.

§ 348(c)(3), (4) (1976) (food additive petition); see Hirich and Staelin, Regulation of the U.S.
Food Industry, in

SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION, APP. TO VOL. VI: FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATION, S. Doc. No. 14, 96th

Cong., Ist Sess. 397 (1978); Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug
Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994 (1977); Note, Pesticide Regulation: Risk
Assessment and Burden of Proof, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1066, 1078-81 (1977). See also
TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT chs. VI, VII (Aug.
1979) (draft).
Section 355(d) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act provides that the Secretary can
refuse to approve any new drug if industry fails to submit adequate tests of safety or
substantial evidence of effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976). Similarly, the Federal
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to develop extensive data to establish the safety of a product before it will
be allowed on the market. The model was proposed, but eventually
abandoned, during the vigorous debate that attended enactment of the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.212
Under this model, as with the free market model, lack of data is a
reason for nonapproval, and the charge is often heard that good ideas die
prematurely as sacrifices to the demands of red tape.2 13 Proof is hard to
come by because there is limited commercial experience to draw on.
Government decisionmakers are bolder because they confront no larger
constituency of users in opposition, and consequently few objections in the
event of a denial.
The market failure model should be reserved for instances where
health or environmental spillover costs dominate the picture or where the
innovation is dictated by government policies independently of market
forces. The market failure model may be used in conjunction with, or as a
variation of, the cost-oblivious statutes where the proponent of the activity must overcome a congressional presumption that the costs of the
activity outweigh its benefits. But its data production requirements may
also be used in conjunction with a cost-sensitive statutory charter.2 1 4
Thus, placement and definition of the burden of proof, like the basic
decision on the utility of cost-benefit analysis, is a legislative choice of no
small moment. In a world of uncertainty, the burdens of proof and
persuasion reign supreme. The question, to be sure, is susceptible to
restatement in the comprehensive dicta of formal decisionmaking-the
benefits of increased public protection must be weighed against the costs
of collecting information and discouraging innovation. 215 But posing a
formal question does not assure a formal answer. Congress must make
delicate legislative judgments about how much and what kind of information is needed to regulate on a subject, who must produce it, and where
the line is drawn on the agency's duty of explanation and its responsibility
for choice.
Environmental Pesticide Control Act authorizes the Administrator of EPA to determine
what information will be required "to support the registration of a pesticide." 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). The ensuing compromise of premarket notification is described in Office of Toxic Substances, EPA, A Summary of the Toxic Substances
Control Act, in Ass'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, Toxic TORTS; TORT ACTIONS FOR
CANCER AND LUNG DISEASE DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION

213. See
AMENDMENTS

S.

330, 333-35

(1977).

PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE

(1974); Hardin, Thre Effects of Over-Regulation, 34 FOOD,

1962

DRUG, & COSM.

L.J. 50 (1979).
214. See, e.g., the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136136y (Supp. 111978). This statute imposes a heavy burden of production on those seeking to
register a pesticide. See note 211 supra. And the courts have recognized that "[t]he burden
of establishing the safety of a product requisite with the labelling requirements remains at all
times on the applicant." Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Yet the statute employs a scheme which is strongly cost-sensitive. See 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(A-D) (Supp. II 1978).
215. See H. Raiffa, supra note 38.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Contemporary enthusiasts of cost-benefit analysis reach for a goal as
noble as rational thought in a complex world. But the theory arrogantly
and doggedly offers a "best" solution, in terms of a limited efficiency
criterion, and comes up short. It is a theory that does not work well for
decisions of high uncertainty, troubling intangibles, and extensive income
transfers. Often, it is a theory that should be repudiated, or supplemented,
in legislative instructions to the agencies defining the rules of decision and
burdens of proof.
But the chief limits of cost-benefit analysis come not from a theory
that fails to tell people how to think, or how to choose the "best" among
competing values. They come from a practice that lacks common goals,
standards, and credibility. There is no such thing as a common species of
cost-benefit analysis and it would be well to recognize that the practice
serves different roles in decisionmaking and connotes varying degrees of
formality. It presumes analytical superiority and seeks to escape a
record of several decades of carnival hucksterism. It encourages quantification and the use of mathematics, but pays heavily in the loss of
information. It serves the worst, along with the best, of bureaucratic
goals.
Thus, more skepticism is due the conventional justification for costbenefit undertakings-that there is value in the process apart from results.
What is needed is improvement in method and a move towards consensus
on standards of practice. Analysts should strive to make clear what was
done and why, the value judgments that permeate the analysis, and the
sensitivity of the conclusions to them.
But above all, an appreciation of the limits of formal analysis must
inform legislative structuring of agency decisionmaking, and allocation of
the burdens of proof. In health and environmental regulation, judgments
about fundamental moral and policy questions govern decisionmaking.
Congress, therefore, must address these issues in its charters to the
regulators through careful definition of the role of cost-benefit analysis in
their decisions, and through appropriate assignment of the burdens of
production and persuasion. These mechanisms are essential tools to legislative and judicial control over agency decisionmaking in these difficult
but vital areas.

